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Abstract
In the recent years money laundering schemes have grown in complexity and
speed of realization, affecting financial institutions and millions of customers
globally. Strengthened privacy policies, along with in-country regulations, make
it hard for banks to inner- and cross-share, and report suspicious activities for
the AML (Anti-Money Laundering) measures. Existing topologies and models
for AML analysis and information sharing are subject to major limitations, such
as compliance with regulatory constraints, extended infrastructure to run high-
computation algorithms, data quality and span, proving cumbersome and costly
to execute, federate, and interpret. This paper proposes a new topology for ex-
ploring multi-banking customer social relations in AML context – customer-to-
customer, customer-to-transaction, and transaction-to-transaction – using a 3D
modeling topological algebra formulated through Poincaré embeddings.
1 Introduction
AML (Anti-Money Laundering) exploration can take different pathways for each financial or related
institution and there are multiple factors which contribute, e.g., institution type, segment, region, lan-
guage, country regulations. Absence of a unified strategy alongside with known technical limitations
present main vulnerability and expose such fragmented financial domain to continuously evolving
fraud schema risks. KYC (Know Your Customer) and AML requirements represent old problems
for the financial domain, however, in the recent years the increased strength of the rules for data pri-
vacy and security boosted them as the focus of each financial player with major impact and massive
financial fines.
The impact of GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) [1] in the financial field made it almost
impossible for financial institutions to share malicious customer activity reports due to personal in-
formation constraints. The emphasized data privacy measures that had to be implemented to protect
genuine customers also allow for the wicked ones to thrive – situation in many aspects resembles the
“chicken and egg” paradigm [2]. Groups of malicious customers usually operate as networks across
multiple banks, therefore, analysis of their connectivity has to be performed.
Current technology solutions explore various topological structures, e.g., matrices [3], graphs [4],
and various variants of neural networks [5] with known limitations: the amount of data that can
be analyzed, its quality and duplication, possibility to discover logical and cross-referenced rela-
tionships that can point to SAR (Suspicious Activity Reports). Given the current topologies, the
complexity of each structure can reach O(n2) limiting the scaling, while transaction-to-transaction
scenarios or correlating customer-to-transactions in billion-row data volumes becomes impossible
to explore.
33rd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019), Vancouver, Canada. Workshop
on Robust AI in Financial Services: Data, Fairness, Explainability, Trustworthiness, and Privacy.
Recent year breakthroughs shifted the perspective from relational matrix analysis on a big data
systems (e.g. Hadoop) to applications of homogeneous graphs and neural networks, which enhance
discovery of customer relationships and their interaction patterns. However, scalability of these
models is limited by a large memory use, slow learning rate, difficulty to transfer them to new
datasets, and low capability for distributed architectures. In banking ecosystems restricted access to
information and business flows makes the real-time processing difficult. Therefore, capturing SAR
patterns and transferring them to an exhaustive topology that can learn, share, and express features
in a federated multi-banking manner, as proposed by this paper, addresses a major industry problem.
The KYC/AML ecosystem involves multiple parties and steps for the detection of SARs, implying
that analysts and regulators must have the ability to validate, explore, make corrections, feed new
findings/patterns into the system, and have historical explainability of the results. Reporting back to
the mentioned constraints, this paper proposes a new approach and topology for expressing the cus-
tomer relationships, allowing to visualize and explore the data in a spherical 3D Poincaré space. The
approach accounts for transformation from a sparse matrix 2D into a finite condensed 3D space, i.e.,
matrices are O(n2) and high-graphsO(n log(n)). Replacing the Euclidean distances with Poincaré
allows the 3D sphere to be limited to a finite radius and create a natural taxonomy classifier of the
customer relationships.
2 Data and Approach
The dataset was designed by the Financial Conduct Authority (UK) for their annual “2019 Global
AML and Financial Crime TechSprint” [6] in collaboration with SYNTHETICR, considering real
world scenarios and AML/KYC patterns, i.e., laundromat, layered, dispersal, and collecting net-
works, among others. The explored dataset is based on a simulated multi-banking transaction sce-
nario, comprising of six individual financial institutions with the characteristics provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Data corpora characteristics of six banks.
Corpora component Volumetric
Accounts per bank 1. 273k – large
2. 177k – medium
3. 154k – medium
4. 147k – medium
5. 95k – small
6. 74k – small
Account holders – 396k – female
– 316k – male
– 58k – company
Unique individuals ∼200k after entity resolution
typo corrections and deduplication
Customer nationality – 750k UK
– 11k Poland
– 5k Romania
– 4k India
– others
The total amount of data provided in CSV
format was∼250 GB, containing∼0.9 mil-
lion accounts and ∼1 billion transactions
over period of 24 months distributed across
six banks. The CSV files were converted
into HDF5 format using Vaex [7] for real-
time scanning, e.g., selecting all transac-
tions of a target account and displaying
transaction money amount as a function of
time. The analyzed corpora contained only
∼10% (108k) transactions in the dataset,
which were provided with “source-origin”
and “destination-origin” account numbers,
i.e., not cash, contact-less, or open-ended
operations. For fast interactive exploratory
analysis and visualization TOPCAT tool
[8] was used.
The dataset contained mappings of the following relationships: customer-to-bank, bank-to-account,
account-to-transaction, customer-to-customer, customer-to-related-party, related-party-to-risk-
intelligence. Data tables used for analysis and their aliases are presented in Table 2; columns
doc_id, entity_id, and relation_duration_months were created. The financial crime activity
for a specific customer was marked in RISK table, column fincrime_risk_exit was used as main
indicator, while columns black_list and aml_flag were used as secondary indicators of suspicious
activities.
Two money laundering schemes “collecting network” and “layered network” were investigated on
the dataset in preparation for the Poincaré embedding of customer-to-customer relationship mapping
to visualize fraudulent relationships in 3D space. The “collecting network” describes customers that
act as an entry point for distinct networks of criminal customers (individuals or companies). Ac-
counts that were opened and closed within the time span of 8 months were considered, correlating
them with customers associated to the accounts with fincrime_risk_exit = true. The list of cus-
tomers that most likely belong to this scheme was produced, identifying 124 account with accuracy
of 90%.
2
Table 2: Data table schemas used for analysis.
Customer Profile Customer Related Party Link Customer Related Parties Party Risk Intelligence
Columns: 41 7 26 9
Alias: CUSTOMERS LINK PARTIES RISK
bank_id bank_id bank_id bank_id
bank_name bank_name bank_name bank_name
customer_id customer_id customer_id customer_id
id_doc_number ... id_doc_number ...
company_registration_id ... company_registration_id ...
doc_id ... doc_id ...
... related_party_id related_party_id related_party_id
... relation_start_date ... ...
... relation_end_date ... ...
... ... ... fincrime_risk_exit
entity_id relation_duration_months entity_id ...
CUSTOMERS and RISK: 923,622 rows. fincrime_risk_exit for 2,785 banned customers.
id_doc_number: 90% (individuals). company_registration_id: 10% (companies).
The “layered network” activities are focused on the accounts that are connected to criminals. Any
account that had any transfer with a confirmed criminal account identified in “collecting network”
was considered. All the transactions per such account were binned into weeks with the underlying
idea that this should be enough time to transfer money to and from the account. For each account
every week the number of transactions and accumulated sum for inbound and outbound transfers
was calculated. To take into consideration the low balance at the end of the week, all the accounts
that had a balance larger than 20% of the accumulated sum of inbound transactions were filtered.
This resulted in 288 identified fraudulent accounts with an accuracy of 90% on confirmed results.
However, the main analyzed relationship of this study was a customer-to-customer relation, com-
prising of social interactions, their duration time, activity, and risk criteria. It was considered to
be the central relationship to explore under the following hypothesis: a customer (person identified
by id_doc_number, i.e., passport, or company identified by company_registration_id, i.e., num-
ber given by common registry) can have numerous accounts in different banks and the linkage via
customer-to-bank, bank-to-account, and account-to-transaction relations interconnects customers
into a relation graph.
The graph can be imagined as arranged in three homogeneous planes (individuals, accounts, trans-
actions) with the following properties: a) individuals can have 1:M accounts over multiple banks,
b) some of individuals have associated risk intelligence records across different banks, c) account
has 1:M transactions that identify behavior patterns by time, frequency, amount or operation. The
above proposed 3D model of the customer relation graph extends enormously in Euclidean space.
However, once embedded in n-dimensional Poincaré space (in subsequent analysis 3D is used), it
is limited to a finite radius, allowing visualization, and has customer relationships classified by tax-
onomy. There is a possibility to extend the analysis in transaction time domain, since AML fraud
schemes have patterns in time. From the provided data, a social relation graph of ∼200,000 unique
individuals within a simulated multi-banking dataset using Poincaré embeddings was explored. Two
types of customers were considered: individuals and companies. Links between customers based on
their social relations and their duration time was considered.
Note 1. Using existing approaches this large graph could be represented as a sparse square matrix,
which would require 200 × 200 typical computer screens arranged as a grid to display it. Visual
inspection of relationship matrix was performed without obtaining insight on the sparsity pattern in
representation of the data, except that the connection structure on the large scale view looks random.
Note 2. There is a significant interest in banking data analysis to tackle the anti-money laundering
problem via transaction analysis. A graph learning approach has been introduced [5] and was based
on simulations within a single bank. Evolving graph convolutional networks have been proposed for
node and edge classification, and link prediction [9].
Note 3. Big data manipulation exposes common “knowns” as incompleteness, redundancy, incon-
sistency and incorrectness, therefore entity resolution curation is a necessary step before starting the
actual data analysis.
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3 Experiments
Embeddings are a widely used approach to create a low-dimension representation of a given graph
[10]. Comprehensive surveys have been provided for graph [11] and network [12] embeddings.
Poincaré embeddings have shown a good performance in learning the representations of graphs in
n-dimensional Poincaré ball by capturing context and hierarchy of related entities [13]. Taking
as reference point the approach developed developed by [14] (see for the detailed description of
the method and its application on various graphs), this paper explores the customer-to-customer
relationship in a 3D Poincaré space, extending the approach into a banking domain with the purpose
to identify potential suspicious/criminal activities across the banking operations.
3.1 Customer links
The linkages for the customer-to-customer relationship analysis were mapped using the data schema
and table aliases described in Table 2. Columns of the tables are referenced by table’s name as a
prefix, e.g., CUSTOMERS:bank_id. To define the Poincaré sphere space, the customer-to-customer rela-
tionship from table PARTIESwas modelledwith the following data observations: PARTIES:entity_id
contains only individuals, not companies. To identify unique customers an internal match (i.e. group
by) on PARTIES:id_doc_number was performed, resulting in 63,912 unique entities with sparse rela-
tionships links in range from 0 to 32 with various PARTIES:related_party_id entities.
To measure relationship duration table LINK was used to extract relationship start-end information.
Relationship duration time (LINK:relation_duration_months) is an attribute of the link and is used
as a weight of the graph edge between the nodes (entities) when performing the Poincaré embedding.
The longest relation duration was ∼600 months.
To identify entities in CUSTOMERS and PARTIES tables, id_doc_number was used for individuals and
company_registration_id for companies. An entity is either an individual or a company, but no
companies were found in PARTIES as noted above. A new doc_id column was created in these tables
from id_doc_number with prefix “individual_” or from company_registration_id with prefix “com-
pany_”. Finally, internal match was performed on CUSTOMERS:doc_id and PARTIES:doc_id columns
separately to count unique entities and to create CUSTOMERS:entity_id and PARTIES:entity_id
columns. Entity cross-identification was realized through the following cross-joins:
PL = merge(PARTIES, LINK,
left_on=[PARTIES:bank_id, PARTIES:related_party_id],
right_on=[LINK:bank_id, LINK:related_party_id])
PLC = merge(PL, CUSTOMERS,
left_on=[LINK:bank_id, LINK:customer_id],
right_on=[CUSTOMERS:bank_id, CUSTOMERS:customer_id])
PLCR = merge(PLC, RISK,
left_on=[CUSTOMERS:bank_id, CUSTOMERS:customer_id],
right_on=[RISK:bank_id, RISK:customer_id], how=’left’))
Further analysis of the resulting table PLCR showed that the customer relation graph contains
links from individuals to companies. To create a data structure suitable for Poincaré embeddings
with [14] program, a list of tuples, consisting of (ID1, ID2, weight) must be provided. Since
PARTIES:entity_id can be linked to CUSTOMERS:entity_id via several banks (up to six) with
different relation duration times, it was decided to treat these relations separately. Finally, the
data created for Poincaré embeddings contained these columns: ID1 = PARTIES:entity_id, ID2 =
CUSTOMERS:bank_id + CUSTOMERS:entity_id, weight = LINK:relation_duration_months. There
are 205,207 edges (relation links) in the graph and 151,044 nodes – unique entities, i.e., individuals
and companies, which are treated as separate entities if have accounts in different banks.
3.2 Poincaré relationship mapping
A entity-to-entity relation graph was constructed from the list of (entity, entity, weight) tuples, which
is passed as input to the algorithm to perform Poincaré embedding. The embedded entity (individual
or a company) is represented as a 3D vector of float numbers within ranges −1 to 1. The entity
representation vectors are moved in the Poincaré space using the following transformation sequence:
a) initially the vectors are assigned random values close to zero (Gaussian with zero mean and
standard deviation of 0.001), b) in each step a random pairing of entities is performed, c) for linked
entities their vectors are brought closer together and not linked entities the vectors are moved further
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a)
Iteration: 30
✲
✻
 
 
 
 ✠
b)
Iteration: 40
c)
Iteration: 60
d)
Iteration: 80
Figure 1: 3D Poincaré embeddings of the customer-to-customer relations are projected onto a plane.
Dots show entity vectors with origin at the center, color-coded corresponding to number of con-
nections they have, from 2 (yellow/green) to more than 10 (dark blue). Grey shaded circle is a
Poincaré sphere of radius 1. Panels show progress of embedding iterations 30, 40, 60, and 80. Three
groupings of customers emerge in panel b).
apart by computing the objective function as a sum of Poincaré distances between the vectors as
described in [14].
Fig. 1 shows sequence of embeddings representations during the progress of model training; num-
ber of training iterations was limited due to data access policy set by the “2019 Global AML and
Financial Crime TechSprint” [6] and additional iterations could have improved the results.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, it takes 80 iterations for some entity embedding vectors to asymptotically
approach length of ∼1 in Euclidean space, which corresponds to infinite distance in Poincaré space.
A useful feature of Poincaré representation is that the maximum length of embedding vector is 1,
and since it is a non-linear space, entity vector representations are approaching 1 asymptotically. If
the entities were not connected, they would be embedded on the surface of radius = 1 sphere and
with maximum separation along great circle lines connecting them. If entities are highly connected,
they are brought closer together.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, Poincaré embeddings of customer-to-customer relationship revealed inter-
esting groupings of entities. Entities with low and high connectivity are initially separated into two
clusters (Fig. 1 b). Low connectivity entities are pushed towards the boundary of the lower left half
of the sphere. Upper right is occupied by∼28,000 high connectivity entities. As training progresses,
an intermediate elongated group appears (Fig. 1 c–d), containing∼6,000 entities.
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a)
Suspicious: 10
b)
Suspicious: 11
c)
Suspicious: 14
d)
Suspicious: 15
Figure 2: Same as Fig. 1 d) after 80 iterations of Poincaré embedding, but color-coded in gray. Each
panel shows a single entity marked by positive fincrime_risk_exit and magenta lines linking it to
its related parties. Number of links is indicated in top left corner of each panel.
Although the initial embedding vector values and the training process is random, by running the
embeddings with different initial conditions it was verified that the clusters finally obtained are
stable and can be reliably distinguished from a random chance. Only the 3D rotation of the whole
system is arbitrary.
4 Results and Discussion
Fig. 2 shows that entities marked with positive fincrime_risk_exit, i.e., have been banned from
banks due to financial crimes, are highly-connected and belong to the grouping of other highly-
connected entities. Each panel shows the “suspicious” entity with magenta lines indicating links to
its related parties. Majority of the “suspicious” entities reside in the upper right compact grouping
and have connections mostly within this grouping or intermediate elongated grouping below. Note,
that connections are displayed as lines assuming Euclidean space for simplicity.
In Fig. 3 entities with highest number of connections are shown, starting with 32 and continuing
to 20. Highly connected entities reside in the outer part of embeddings and are linked with upper
right grouping of entities. Comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 entities with positive fincrime_risk_exit
coincide with grouping of highly connected ones.
There are 2,785 entities with positive fincrime_risk_exit and highly connected group contains
∼28,000 entities, 90% of remaining ones could be suspects for further investigation. The 3D embed-
dings space was chosen to give additional degree of freedom, scalability, dimensionality reduction
and new pattern approach perspective (shapes) in respect to other studies using 2D embeddings, but
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a)
Links: 32
b)
Links: 25
c)
Links: 23
d)
Links: 20
Figure 3: Same as Fig. 1 d). Panels highlight entities with number of their connections indicated
in top left corner, starting with single entity with 32 connections in panel a) and continuing to
increasing number of entities with up to 20 connections. Red lines indicate links. Upper right
grouping of entities is highly inter-connected.
still providing us with comprehensible insights. Entities that are “proxies”, connecting two or more
clusters of highly connected entities, in many scenarios tie together a suspicious cluster with a clus-
ter that at the first sight looks clean. Isolated entities have less than two connections which either
stand by themselves (they are flagged as initial “unknowns”, as these do not exhibit any character
or linkage for being classified as suspicious or clean), or are in the extended radius of a cluster,
meaning that they will most-likely join that cluster in time and start forming relationships.
Using Poincaré embeddings it was possible to visualize and naturally classify a large interconnected
datasets that would have been impossible to plot in a graph and clearly see the connections. A cluster
identification technique, suitable for Poincaré distances, should be used to identify entity groupings
of interest.
5 Conclusions
This paper demonstrated that 3D Poincaré embeddings can represent complex multi-banking cus-
tomer social relations and allow identification of similarities among customers. Entities tagged by
financial crime exit flag are highly connected and belong to the grouping of other highly connected
entities.
The general construction of a relation high-graph is complicated and entity resolution is a major
source of noise since same individuals or companies are present in registries of different banks.
Working with simulated data partly addressed the problem, because individuals were uniquely iden-
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tified via passport number and companies via company registration number, which simplified finding
links between customers and embedding them in 3D Poincaré space.
The simulated data by SYNTHETICR aimed to follow real world financial interaction and crime
scenarios to provide a global view of customer relations in multi-banking scenario. Nevertheless,
consolidating the experiment in a real-bank scenario is necessary with pursue of entity resolution
and deduplication before relationship embeddings to avoid noise and accuracy loss. The approach
proposed in this paper could be extended to transaction data, potentially share-able as encrypted
account numbers among banks, and applicable to the real world.
6 Future work
Going further the aim is to explore the capabilities of Poincaré embeddings in transactional rela-
tionships and to expand them by the federated learning concept using descriptive features, which
are clear of personal information and can be shared between multiple banks. Analysis of known
complex patterns, e.g., laundromat, and search for new patterns has to be performed. Clustering and
discovery in a naturally and hierarchically embedded customer relation data is a key feature missing
in current existing approaches based on matrix and graph analysis, which is needed to identify mali-
cious networks. Carving this experiment to the financial industry domain, this paper opens the stage
for near- and real- time SAR processing and data exploration, defining an architecture and topology
for secure federated learning and insights sharing in a close to opaque industry.
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